



RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.
SECOND ARTICLE.
It is not pretended that much direct precedent can be found for
denominating the interest which the public have in a railroad an
easement. A different phraseology might be resorted to; but this
term is simple and definite, it is exactly descriptive of the nature of
the use, and it implies no incident which cannot be established by-
express authorities, or by fair deduction from them. It has the-
further recommendation that it adapts itself readily to all the differ-
ent sorts of railroads, and to the different rights by which a company
may hold the several parts of the same road: we thus realize the
benefit of having taken the most complicated example as the type
of all. Strip the corporation of the ownership of the fee, it remains
manager of the highway with all the privileges and duties belonging
to that character. The franchise, which was always distinct from
the estate, is now separated from it. That franchise cannot bo-
aliened without the consent of the legislature ; it cannot be taken.
on execution; nor can its exercise be impeded by any transactions.
which are going on in relation to the estate. What impropriety is-
there in the proposed description to counterbalance the advantages ?:
the. only difficulty of any importance is the confusion growing out-
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of the fact, that the right by which the company occupy the road is
apt to be called their easement, and is properly enough so called if
it be understood that it is theirs in trust. A corporation authorized
by its charter to occupy a certain common highway, did so, and then
claimed that it was merely keeping up the previous public easement.
The owner of the fee sought compensation. The court held that he
must have it, because, (said Chief Justice Nelson) what the company
claimed "was an easement, not a right of passage to the public, but
to the company. The public may travel with them over the track
if they choose to ride in their cars, but pevertheless the company
are not the public, nor can they be regarded as standing in the place
of the public."' But could not another answer have readily been
found ? The easement sought in that case, whether by the public
or not, was a new easement, different from the old one; a right of
passage on foot does not include a right of passage by cart and
wagon: no more does a right of passage on a macadamized road
include a right to make cuttings and embankments, and to be drawn
on a railway by a steam locomotive. Much after the same manner
it used to be common to say that a turnpike-road was the private
easement of the company. Turnpikes, we are told,2 had their begin-
ning in the unauthorized conduct of certain individuals who merely
for the sake of improving the road they were accustomed to travel,
took possession of the common highway, erected gates, and devoted
the tolls exclusively to repairs. No question could be made here of
the continuance of the highway. Afterwards, when new turnpike
roads were opened, expressly with a view to the private benefit of
the companies, it was decided that these roads also were public
highways; and, being such, it was clear they were public easements.
At this day it would probably be disputed nowhere that the com-
pany, though nominally possessing the easement in their own right,
hold it for the public. But railroads, of the kind common in
England, and of which there are still examples in this country, rail-
roads on which every man may of right run his own engine
and car, differ in no material respect from turnpike roads. It must
be acknowledged that in a railroad of that sort the public have an
' 3 Barb. Sup. C. R. 468. 2 6M. & W. 428.
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easement. We have already seen, however, that the additional
restriction which confines passengers to the vehicles of the company
takes nothing from the public character of the work. Now it was
that public character which constituted the public easement.
These points, then, seem tolerably certain :
1. A railroad corporation has a legal estate in the soil of the road.
2. That estate is subject to the public dastment.
3. The corporation is entrusted with the care and direction of
the easement.
If we apply these principles to the case of a mortgage by the
corporation of its real estate, we see that they do not make the
transaction void for want of a.subject matter to operate upon, they
only render it utterly nugatory as to all practical effects. It
would be possible, however, for a court to assume a still higher tone.
Why was it that the corporation was allowed to take the fee and
was not left, like a turnpike company, to an easement? The motive
must have been to give some additional facility to the making and
repair of the road. If then it is for the advantage of the public
that the freehold and the regulation of the highway be in. the same
hands, and if the legislature so intended, a reason would not seem
to be wanting for disallowing a separation of the two. Again, the
court in State vs. Rives, admit that a franchise is by its nature
incapable of transfer, unless with the aid of the power that first
bestowed it. Now, although the general right to hold land may be
an incident of a corporation, the right to take it as a railway is
taken, and to hold it attended with the conditions and privileges
which go with land so taken by virtue of a chartered authority, seems
not to be a common incident but a true franchise, and therefore
incapable per se of alienation. There is an English statute, profes-
sedly declaratory and retrospective, and so a good witness, which
affirms that all mortgages not directly authorized by a railroad com-
pany's charter are void at common law.1 It is unnecessary at this
time to inquire more minutely into these last doctrines; it is suffi-
cient if upon any view that can be taken the practical result is that
.7 and 8 Vict. cap. 85, 19. The language of the act covers all unauthorized
securities.
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nothing of substantial value passes by the conveyance. If the new
purchaser may do no act interfering with the use of the road, it per-
haps matters little whether he possess the fee or not.
But very often the legislature expressly authorizes the corporation
to borrow on mortgage; and it is important to know how the cases
to which the execution of the power gives rise, are to be dealt with.
They fall within one or the other of two classes. Sometimes the
State having lent its credit to the company, becomes itself the mort-
gagee. Do the objections which apply to mortgages in general
apply to this? It is not inconsistent with the principles we have
been following to hold that they do not. They suggest no reason
why the enjoyment of an easement should stand in the way of a sub-
sequent acquisition of the freehold. That right of passage which
the public has by one title, it is possible for it to have by a still
higher title. Yet there is room to urge that although the State may
not lose any of its already vested rights by foreclosure of the mort-
gage, it does not obtain that which was the object of the security,
the payment of the debt: it becomes owner of the soil, but so the
creditor of a turnpike company may gain the fee of their road, and
still be no nearer the recovery of his money. This advantage, how-
ever, follows: the insolvency of the railroad corporation being ground
of forfeiture, the State is able to unite the possession both of the
franchise and of the highway. As there are no lands left to revert
at the dissolution of the corporation to the grantors, all the benefits
of an escheat are realized: the death of the trustee does not now
destroy the trust, and the public road survives the private builder.
With respect to the second class which comprehends the cases
where authority is given to raise money by pledging the road to
another corporation, or to an individual, so much depends on the
phraseology of the particular act that little can here be said to
advantage. A few general observations may be hazarded. If the
terms of the- statute are such that the power of collecting tolls does
not attend upon the mortgagee's interest in the road; a court might
be warranted in holding that the intention of the legislature would
be best effectuated by altering the status of the parties no farther
than to require the officers of the corporation to pay over the net
eceipts to the mortgagee. In this way the corporation would become
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as it were the lessee, or servant, of the legal owner, who on his part
would receive the whole rents and profits of the estate on which he
had entered. Authority for such construction is not wanting. In
Doe dem Hfyatt vs. St. .elen's Ky. Co.," a power to assign the
undertaking" and the C1 property" of the company was held by the
Queen's Bench not to be a power to demise the land. No power
havingbeen given to transfer the franchise of the tolls, COLERIDGE, J.,
in view of this circumstance remarks that the undertaking would be
destroyed if the mortgagee were to succeed in his ejectment; and
adds it is "monstrous and improbable" to suppose that the act con-
templated the repayment of the money borrowed on mortgage by
means inconsistent with the continuance of the railway. The same
judge observed that mandamus might be the proper remedy. If a
mortgagee seek relief in equity, it is necessary for the other mort-
gagees, if there be any, either prior or subsequent, to be made parties
to the bill. In many instances the language of the legislature will
be found to admit of a construction carrying the franchise along with
the estate, and the mortgagee may simply take the place of the
company.
The mortgage may be of a portion only of the road, and here a
court will doubtless be ready to enforce some arrangement which
shall subserve the general convenience. Of all the cases, in short,
it may be said we shall best succeed in their resolution, if we take
it as a maxim that the charter must be so construed as not to defeat
the public objects for which it was granted.
The recognition of the public character of the railroad contributes
to build up no undue corporate privilege. On the contrary, it is
only by thus distinguishing the corporation from the highway which
runs upon its land, and over which it exercises control, that we can
see how to hold it to its proper responsibilities. The road being
public, is to be preserved as such. The company is private, and
must be treated by the law like other associations formed for pur-
poses of private gain. The only remaining difficulty is to discern
whether the various particular questions as they arise, relate to the
public interest or to the private, to the highway or to the company.
12 Ad. &E., N. S. 364.
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Some concern the corporation doubtless has in every measure
affecting the railroad undertaking; but does it have this in any given
case directly, and as a trading company, or do they get it through
the road? In other words, is the proposed measure essential or not
to the public easement ? The use of steam, for instance, as a loco-
motive agent, though a chief source of profit to the corporation,
and though subjecting individuals, and especially those who do not
travel upon the road to much annoyance and danger, is held to have
so necessary a connection with the railway that the corporation, in
putting engines upon the rails, merely fulfils its duty as manager of
the improved public highway. It is not responsible for the risk
inseparable from the employment of that dangerous agent, any more
than the ship-owner is responsible for the consequences of a tempest.
As a carrier, however, the railroad corporation is liable for any want
of care in the. use of this means of propulsion. There has been
some diversity in the practical enforcement of the liability. Penn-
sylvania courts have held that, in an action against the company
to recover damages for a fire occasioned by sparks from one of their
engines, the plaintiff must make out a case of negligence by positive
proof.1 But in England the Court of Common Pleas ruled, that the
fact of a damage resulting from the sparks raises the presumption
of negligence; and renders it incumbent on the company to show
the actual exercise by themselves and their agents of all due care.
2
The legislature of Massachusetts has gone farther, and by a strin-
gent, yet not unwise-provision, has made railroad companies respon-
sible for all damages done by sparks from their locomotives. 3 The
act gives them at the same time an insurable interest in the build-
ings along the road. Is there not room however for a doubt. as to
the constitutionalty of imposing a duty of this kind upon a corpo-
ration in existence at the time of the passage of the act ? The jury
in assessing damages in favor of the proprietors along the road,
must, it would seem, have estimated the risk from fire among the
items of account, and thus the operation of this statute is to make
the company twice insurers. The charter of the Boston and Wor-
1 8 Barr, 866. 2 10 Jur. 571.
3 Mass. ea'l Laws, 1840, oh. 85. Some R. R. chartem contain a similar provision.
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cpster Railroad,1 the earliest of thi important railroads in the State,
declares that the verdict of the jury shall forever be a bar to all
claim for damages on account of the presence of the road.
That the railroad company (unless aided by statute) must con-
tribute like other corporations to the support of the State, is plain.
Here, as elsewhere, the only difficulty that could arise is in relation
to the railway. But the circumstance that the public make use of
the road is no reason for its being exempted from taxation. The
land is owned by the company: they purchased it voluntarily, and
to promote their private interest. As to individual share holders
the stock is probably, even at common law, personal property ; but
a statute declaring it to be so, still leaves the land real estate as to
the c rporation, and it is liable to be taxed as such.' Though a
contrary decision has been given by the Supreme Court of Maine, it
is not easy to see on what principles it rests. 3
In no character in which the railroad corporation acts, have the
whole community so obvious a concern as in that of common carrier.
Yet, while the importance of the questions growing out of this
branch of the subject cannot be exaggerated3 the ordinary principles.
of bailments for the most part suffice to solve them. The railroad
corporation is indeed by far the greatest common carrier the world
ever saw, or is likely to see; but so happily is the law of carriers
framed, that it is adapted to objects of every magnitude, contract-
ing and expanding with equal facility. And besides, it has been
from the first the policy of the law to regard all common carriers as
quasi public servants; so that the fact that the railroad corporation
is, in a more exact sense, a public servant, constitutes no obstacle
to its being referred to'the same general class. A public quality,
however, mingles with the transactions of the railroad corporation
in this respect as well as others, and it belongs to the plan of this
essay to notice in what manner, if at all, that public interest quali-
fies he company's exercise of its private trade. The nature of the
Lans .f 1829, ch. 2G.
0 Paig. CI. M 1$1 4111 , N. Y. R. 20: 8 M. & W. 422: -Younge & C. 263.
Z hep. 1. 5-q.",
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case renders the easement of the public entirely dependent upon
the fidelity of those to whose charge the road is entrusted; and
hence the State is justified in keeping a closer watch over the pro-
ceedings of the company than would be reconcilable with the prin-
ciples of a free government if the corporation were a mere carrier.
This public quality thus attaches for the restraint of the company
and their agents, and not for the purpose of giving them any greater
license. A railroad company was not allowed to excuse itself for
the violation of a contract with an individual, on the ground that by
so doing it' would be subserving the convenience of travellers.'
Though the rules of good pleading, in strictness, call for different
allegations, if not quite different forms of action, in proceedings
against the corporation as trustee of the highway, and as common
_carrier, yet in an action against it in the latter character, it is com-
petent to introduce evidence whose direct tendency is only to show
that a breach of duty has been committed in the former. For in-
stance, the question is, was there negligence? Now the ill adjust-
ment of the rails at the place where the accident occurred, though
a matter in which the company simply as carrier has nothing to do,
is yet a circumstance which may go to the jury.
There is one respect in which the public office of the company
either has a very important bearing upon its liability in its private
capacity, or has little or none-just according as one view or an-
other is taken of a principal point in the law of carriers. It is ad-
mitted everywhere that the responsibility of a carrier of passengers
is not the same as that of a carrier of chattels. While the latter is
an insurer against everything but the act of God or of the King's
enemies, the other is bound only to the exercise of the utmost care.
But in deciding whether or not care was manifested in any given'
case, upon whom does the burden of proof lie ? It seems to be set-
led law in this country that the plaintiff, as soon as he has shown
1 10 Jur. i90. But a court of equity 'will not interfere by injunction, to prevent
the company from running their trains, and conducting the other operations of the
'road, whilbt the rights of the parties on the contract are trying at law. Vide 10
Jur. 631.
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that an accident occurred, has made out a prima facie case.' In
England, notwithstanding the nisi prius decision in Campbell,
2
which has been recognized and followed by American courts as a
leading authority, the rule appears to be by no means equally well
established. And if there be a presumption of negligence, how far is
it to be carried ? What is the amount of care the carrier is bound to
prove ? His duty originally was to display the utmost care. Has
he no help but to be mulcted in damages unless he is able to pro-
duce evidence that that high degree of diligence actually was dis-
played in the particular transaction P According to our law, it
seems he must, yet it is certainly severe doctrine, and falls very little
short of making the common carrier as much an insurer of passen-
gers as of chattels. Perhaps- there is not a single English case in
which the ruling in Christie vs. Grigga is unequivocally recognized
as law. In Carpue vs. The Railway Co., counsel admitted much
against the interest of their cause, anid counsel, too, headed by
such 'a lawyer as Sir Frederick Pollock, the present Lord Chief
Baron of the Exchequer-that the negligence of the defendants must
be proved. He adds: "Here, (referring to the case at bar,) if neg-
ligence in the character of the carriers had not been established,
the defendants would have succeeded under "Not Guilty." Lord
Denman also, in charging the jury at nisi prius, used language
which it is very difficult to believe he would have used had he been
disposed to adopt the law of Christie vs. Grigg8. Supposing, then,
this case of Carpue vs. The Railway Company, to have been based
on the doctrine that ordinary passenger carriers are taken to have
shown due diligence, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
that case establishes a most notable exception with regard to the
railroad corporation. That negligence, which, as against an ordi-
nary carrier of passengers might have to be made out by proof,
is presumed against the railway company because they have, what
no other carrier has, exclusive control of the highway over which
they pass: a privilege which they obtain as managers of the road
they pay for pretty dearly as carriers. Their high police powers
2 Christie vs. Griggs, 2 Campb. 79.113 Pet. 181; 11 Pick. 106.
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were granted to enable them to keep off all trespassers, and none
but themselves can enter upon the road except as wrongful intruders.
Whether therefore, the accident happen in consequence of collision,
of excessive speed, of the bad condition of the rails, or from any
other cause, except one of those interpositions of irresistable external
force which excuse any carrier, it must be traced to some tort of
theirs. But even if this be not the proper construction of Carpue vs..
The Railway Company, it can hardly be doubted that it was there
supposed by-court and bar, that some greater liability was fastened
upon the company than they would have been subjected to had they
not been owners of the road. On the whole it is certain,- that what-
ever be the degree of responsibility imposed upon other carriers,
the rules of bailments undergo no relaxation of their stringency
when they come to be applied to railroad companies. Nor, in justiec
and policy, should they. The railroad corporation possesses a
monopoly, necessary indeed to the general welfare, yet still a
monopoly; it is also vested with enormous power; for both reasons
it ought to be held to strict account.
While enough has been done, as it is hoped, to- show that the
principles we have been following are of no limited nor partial
.nature, but may be taken as useful guides through every division of
this extensive subject, it has been a necessary consequence of the
method pursued that they have been applied more especially to
those rights and liabilities of the railroad corporation which spring
out of its occupancy of land. In order to give a degree of unity to
this attempt, it is not out of place to conclude by considering how
the railroad acts in acquiring the land for its road.
That British legislation is characterized by a far less imperious
disregard of the rights of private land-owners than is common here,
is certain; nor is the fact difficult to be accounted for. The landed
interest in England has great weight in the lower house of Parlia-
ment, and-entirely controls the upper; with us that interest, though
relatively to others far stronger than it is there, has neither been
led by the form of our institutions, nor driven by the pressure of
outward circumstances, to united action. But it is worthy of reflec-
tion, whether the State ought not of its own accord, and from motives
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of the highest policy, to pay that respect to the rights of land-owners
which they themselves, though chafing at the want of it, fail to
insist upon.
In spite of the influences which tend to transmute all things into
subjects of commercial exchange, there must exist, between the pos-
session of land and of other property, a substantial difference, which
neither the philosopher nor the practical statesman can wisely con-
temn. In a world where all objects are sufficiently unsteadfast,
man resorts instinctively to that which by its comparative perma-
nence gratifies his longing for security. It is a grievous moral
injury, as well as a source of discomfort, if he is made to feel that
he can to-day nowhere so entrench himself behind legal or natural
barriers, that wanton force -shall not to-morrow violate his repose.
Railtoads makes States prosperous, and promote international peace:
it becomes us all to desire that the effect of so glorious a picture may
not be marred by the presence in the background of scenes of indi-
vidual oppression. If possible, let there never be found in any
corner of the land, a man who, while looking upon the mighty works
wrought by the "league and partnership of free power with free
will," shall have occasion to sigh after the humble road- of ancient
ordinance which "1 curved round the corn-field and the hill of vines
honoring the holy bounds of property."
A committee of the house of lords reported a recommendation
that the assessment of railway damages should contain the following
elements: a full price for the soil occupied, compensation for the
injury done the estate by severence, all other actual damages, and
finally, an additional compensation, equal to at least fifty per cent
of the value of the land taken, as a salve for the mere compulsion.1
The English courts of chancery have shown, if possible, still more
zeal than Parliament in watching over individual interests. They
have construed the act of incorporation with the utmost strictnesp,
even when the effect was quite to prevent the completion of the
road ;2 they have manifested a strong disposition to rule, that when
such an obstacle does preclude the fulfilment of the Parliamentary
intention, the company shall not proceed even up to the point of
1'odgSon on Railways, p. 20. 10 Jur. 264.
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interruption, but must suspend the undertaking altogether ;' a com-
pany would be enjoined from going to the jury with a claim for more
land than the act, according to the Lord Chancellor's interpreta-
tion, warranted ;2 and it has been declared .that each land owner
along the route, besides his right to have the company's powers
strictly carried into effect as regards his own land, has the right also
to insist that no variation shall be made to his prejudice in carrying
them out upon the lands of others.3 As to the mode of assessing
damages, it seems agreed in this country as well as England, that a
party may be entitled to compensation, although the, road do not
touch his estate,' and that, up to some as yet undefined limit, conse-
'quential, as well as immediate damages are to be estimated. Fur-
ther, the company cannot claim any deduction on account of an
increase of value given by the road to another and detached estate
of the same proprietor.5 The question whether any set-off shall be
allowed of the benefit likely to accrue in consequence of the road to
the particular estate upon which the assessment is making,. is decided
differently in different States. A New York law forbids the set-off.
The charters in many States stipulate for it. Where no legisla-
tive provision has been made, the supreme court of Ohio holds that
the set-off is legal and proper,r the supreme court of Kentucky, that
(except as against a claim for consequential damages,) it is illegal
and improper.8
. Aside from authority, does it not seem a somewhat despotic con-
struction of the just.and liberal rule which requires that private
property shall not be taken without compensation, to say that while
the damage inflicted is immediate and certain, the compensation
may take the shape of a contingency, a prospective advantage which
five men may think they discern, but which a thousand causes may
prevent from ever occurring? And supposing no error of estimate,
110 Jur. 364. 2 K. & Cr. 116. 3 1 Younge & C. 618.4 2 Ad. & El, N. S. 347.
8 Watts, 243. The charter construed in this case may be found in laws of Pa.
1832-33, pp. 141--157. It is similiar in its terms to charters in other States where
deducting for advantages is allowed to some extent.
6 N. Y. Rev. Stats. 1848, 3 vol. 590. 7 14 Ohio R. 147, Read, J. dissent.
8 5 Dana 80. The statutory provision in Virginia agrees substantially with this
decision. Vide Tate's Dig. 766. -
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what can be more unequal? That the country generally is to be
benefited by the opening of railroads, we expect, and have a right
to expect, otherwise, well might we complain that the beauty of our
landscapes is impaired by excavations, and the stillness which once
dwelt upon them banished by the steam whistle. But in what way
has the proprietor through whose land the road passes, who has felt
the injury when others have seen only the benefit, whose feelings
have been lacerated more than his estate by the destruction of objects
of taste and cherished association, forfeited his right to share in that
general pecuniary enhancement of property ? A., whose estate lies
a hundred rods distant from the railroad, finds it increased in value
twenty-five per cent : the land of B., which is severed in twain, would
also be augmented in value to the same extent, were it not that the
loss of soil, and accompanying inconveniences just balance this
improvement. In pocket neither richer nor poorer than before,
the proprietor of the latter estate receives by way of recompense for
his mortification the privilege of observing his neighbor's prosperity,
and of having perpetually before his door what he can only regard
as a stupendous monument of tyranny.
Pennsylvania, whose immense latent resources induce* the most
unremitting efforts to develope them, has gone farthest in extending
encouragement of all kinds to the undertakers of railroads. But
whenever her course of policy is proposed for imitation elsewhere, it
ought to be borne in mind that the proprietary grants, on which all
the titles in the State depend, always contained an allowance of six
per cent for highways, so that a tract nominally of three hundred
acres, consisted of 318; and this circumstance has ever haa great
weight with both legislature and judiciary when the question has
arisen between private right and public convenience. New Jersey
land-patents also have a very similar provision.
The land of the railroad is taken either by the company or by the
State. If, adopting the former view, we regard the transaction as
between a corporation, intent upon a profitable speculation, and an
individual standing on the jus possidentis, there can be little doubt
which party should be treated with favor. If however, it be the
State that takes the land, the private owner ought not to find his
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case made worse; for is it not the duty of every government to
deal gently with the rights of its subjects? Sovereign power is
by its nature parental, and the manner of the exercise should never
fail to be suggestive of the beneficence of the object. The habit
which Democracies are unfortunately too prone to fall into, of using
great freedom in the disposal of the property of individuals is not
more inequitable than unwise. That which begins by tearing out of
a man's breast his attachment to the homestead where he was born,
to the grove he planted in his youth, or even to the field from which
he expects to gather the next year's harvest, will end by extirpating
all love for his country, all loyalty to its institutions.
The law of railroads however considered, is doubtless a very com-
plex subject, and it is with unaffected hesitancy that these observa-
tions upon it are submitted: yet the writer cannot help believing
that it is one step towards its disentanglement to distinguish between
the corporation as the trustee of the highway, and the corporation
as deriving a private profit out of the advantages which that position
affords. Whether the distinction be of value or not, it is at least
apparent that it does not lead to the injurious consequences which
the court in State vs. Rives, was so anxious to shun. It is remark-
able that the same court, which in that case based its decision on a
desire to preserve private rights, has elsewhere subjected itself to
the criticism of Chancellor Kent, for its latitudinary construction of
the doctrine of eminent domain. What we are left to gather from
the whole course of North Carolina decisions is, that the corporation
may proceed with a high hand when it seeks to wrest from innumer-
able private citizens a portion of their property, and that the land,
when thus taken against the will of the occupants, may be seized
upon by any single man who of free choice shall have allowed the
corporation to become his debtor. The original owner, first obliged
to submit to the paramount claims of the public, has afterwards to
see both the rights of that public and his own, mocked by the intru-
sion of a stranger. No such inconsistency attends the adoption of
the views now advocated. According to them, that public use
which justifies the making of the road, protects it when made. Nor
does the immunity which shelters the highway, afford any cover to
